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Mirror neurons and shared circuits for 
action execution and observation
irror neurons were first discovered in the ven-
tral premotor cortex of the monkey (area F5), a cortical
region that was studied for its involvement in action
preparation. They have the astonishing property of firing
not only during action execution, but also as the monkey
observes another individual performing a similar action,
or just upon hearing the sound of the action.
1-5With the
firing of these neurons, the monkey can be said to simu-
late the actions of its conspecifics in that it activates pre-
motor neurons “as if” performing a similar action. Later
on, neurons with the same property were also found in
the inferior parietal cortex of the monkey.
6,7
In humans, noninvasive brain imaging techniques have
provided ample evidence that the premotor and parietal
cortices are not only active during the planning and exe-
cution of actions, but also while someone is observing or
listening to the action performed by someone else
(Figure 1).
8-13The presence of shared circuits for action
execution and action perception is classically attributed
to the functioning of mirror neurons. 
Shared circuits for somatosensation
Importantly, simulation is not restricted to cortices
involved in motor planning: the somatosensory cortex
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Observing another individual acting upon an object trig-
gers cerebral activity well beyond the visual cortex of
the observer in areas directly involved in planning and
executing actions. This we will call action simulation.
Importantly, the brain does not solely simulate the
actions of others but also the sensations they feel, and
their emotional responses. These simulation mechanisms
are most active in individuals who report being very
empathic. Simulation may indeed be instrumental for
our understanding of the emotional and mental state
of people in our sight, and may contribute heavily to
the social interactions with our peers by providing a
first-person perspective on their inner feelings.
Simulation mechanisms are at work at an early stage of
social development and might be defective in young
individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD).
However, the results to date regarding ASD are not
clearcut, and an equal number of studies report positive
and negative findings. 
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also seems capable of vicarious activity.
14-16 It is helpful
to distinguish two forms of somatosensations: passive
touch, where a body is touched by an object, and active
touch, where an individual deliberately touches an
object. For passive touch, evidence accumulates that
while the first levels of cortical somatosensory process-
ing (BA3) only responds when the participant experi-
ences passive touch directly, the higher levels (BA1, 2,
and SII) can also be activated vicariously by the mere
sight of someone else being touched, with this vicarious
activity being most robustly observed in SII.
17-21 For
active touch, BA3 is again only recruited while partici-
pants manipulate objects themselves, but BA2 seems to
be the region most robustly recruited while viewing
other individuals manipulate objects.
10,15 During the
observation of active touch, simulation in the motor sys-
tem seems to go hand in hand with somatosensory sim-
ulation in the higher levels of the somatosensory system:
BA2 and also sometimes SII (Figure 2).
Pathological overactivation of the 
shared circuits for actions and 
tactile sensations
In most situations, one does not experience an actual
sensation of touch upon seeing someone else being
touched or touching an object. Likewise, one does not
normally imitate every movement made by others.
Somehow, the brain can compute a simulation in higher-
level areas (premotor and posterior parietal areas for
actions, and SII and BA2 for somatosensations) without
this simulation contaminating the primary motor cortex
or the lower levels of somatosensory perception. In an
analogy to computers, in which untrusted programs are
“sandboxed,” ie, given limited access to resources to
ensure that they will not cause damage, the brain seems
to sandbox simulations of other people’s actions and
sensations to ensure that they can run safely, without
causing unwanted body movements and misattributed
sensations. There are instances, however, where this
sandboxing mechanism loses its effectiveness. 
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Figure 1. Parietal and premotor cortices are active during the observa-
tion of hand actions. IPS, Intraparietal sulcus; PrC, Precentral
gyrus/sulcus; preSMA, pre-supplemetary motor area; STG,
superior temporal gyrus. Results are from a random effect
analysis of the functional images of 17 participants (P<0.0005
FWE corrected; F3,48 = 20.34). The most anterior part of the
IPS cluster extends to Brodmann area 2 (in the anterior IPS aka
post-central sulcus), the highest level of processing in the pri-
mary somato-sensory cortex. 
Figure 2. Activation of the primary and secondary somatosensory cor-
tices in a single subject observing someone touching an object.
Functional images are superimposed on the subject’s own
anatomy (P<0.05 FDR corrected). (A) Coronal slice 33 mm pos-
terior to the anterior commissure showing the activation of
Brodmann area 2 of the primary somatosensory cortex (SI). (B)
Coronal plane 26 mm posterior to the anterior commissure
showing the activation of the secondary somato-sensory cor-
tex (SII), and sagittal view of the right hemisphere at 60 mm
from the midline showing the same cluster. (C) Overlay of SII
activity on an anatomical probability map showing the loca-
tion of OP1 and OP2 (SPM Anatomy Toolbox). 
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Following brain injury, some patients show a spontaneous
tendency to imitate an experimenter performing various
gestures in front of them—scratching their forehead,
clapping their hands, and so on.
22-24The patients keep imi-
tating the behavior of the experimenter even after being
explicitly told to stop doing so. This phenomenon affects
as many as 4 out of 10 patients with frontal-lobe lesions,
and virtually never occurs as a consequence of
postrolandic brain lesion.
22 Infarct to the anterior cere-
bral artery resulting in medial frontal lesions seems to be
a frequent cause. Imitation behaviors demonstrate the
automatic aspect of simulation. Medial frontal lesions
may impair the functioning of a gating system, resulting
in the release of activity in the primary motor region. 
About 1% of individuals also seem to experience the tac-
tile sensations of others as if they had happened to them-
selves.
25 One of these mirror-touch synesthetes
17 experi-
enced touch upon seeing someone else being touched,
but not when an object was touched. The feeling of touch
was experienced on the same body part as that being
touched on the other person. Functional MRI revealed a
hyperactivation of the somatosensory cortices, the pre-
motor cortex, and the anterior insula relative to controls
during the observation of a video of someone being
touched. Increased activity in the primary somatosensory
cortex (SI) encompassing earlier stages of somatosensory
perception may possibly provoke this phenomenon by
which the feelings of others invade an area that would
normally be reserved for the self. Participants with this
form of synesthesia also report being more empathic.
26
Shared circuits for pain and disgust
The possible importance of shared circuits for under-
standing the emotions of others also became clear early
on,
27 with several studies demonstrating that perceiving
(or imagining) someone else in pain as well as witnessing
disgust on the face of someone provokes an increase of
activity in several brain areas involved in the first-person
experience of these emotions. In one experiment, the par-
ticipants viewed people taking a sip from a glass and
being either disgusted, pleased, or neutral. Disgust obser-
vation was accompanied by a specific increase of activity
in the anterior insular cortex,
28 an area shown to be
strongly activated by the experience of disgust in the
same participants. Moreover, another experiment using
a similar paradigm found that the experience and the
observation of strong gustatory pleasure can also trigger
activity in a similar sector of the insula, suggesting that
this region is not devoted only to the processing of neg-
ative emotions.
29 Using Granger causality analysis, this
vicarious activity in the insula appears to be triggered by
activity in the inferior frontal gyrus,
30 a region active both
while viewing facial expressions and while performing
similar expressions.
31,32This suggests that the insula per-
forms an emotional simulation of what it would feel like
to experience the positive or negative emotions of oth-
ers, and that this simulation can be triggered by inputs
from the region performing a motor simulation of the
observed facial expressions. Multiple experiments have
also demonstrated the involvement of the anterior cin-
gulate cortex and the insula during pain observation.
Increased activity is found in these regions when the par-
ticipants are shown body parts in various painful situa-
tions,
33-39 as well as when observing a painful facial expres-
sion,
40,41 or just upon knowing that a loved one is
experiencing pain.
42,43 Furthermore, in at least two exper-
iments, the level of activity in these regions was corre-
lated to the intensity of the pain perceived, in accordance
with the hypothesis of a role of simulation in under-
standing the feelings of others.
36,41
Empathy and shared circuits
Unsurprisingly, the capacity to empathize with other indi-
viduals seem to have some relationships with the func-
tioning of the shared circuits.
16,27 Empathy, the ability to
share other people’s inner feelings, can be measured
through a questionnaire where participants judge
whether they are more or less likely to tremble when see-
ing the main character of a movie in a difficult situation,
to take the point of view of someone else during a fight,
and so on.
44
A number of researchers have now reported positive cor-
relations between the strength of the response in simu-
lation areas and the empathy scores of the participants.
In one study conducted in our lab, the activation of the
premotor cortex upon hearing the sound of actions was
extremely strong in the most empathic participants and
virtually inexistent in those participants with the lowest
empathy scores.
9 Similarly, in the domain of emotions,
there is evidence that the level of activity in the insula
and the anterior cingulate cortex is augmented in
empathic individuals witnessing disgust on a face
29 or
becoming aware that their partner is experiencing pain.
43
These results indicate that shared circuits may play a key
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role in social cognition by providing a first-person (vic-
arious) perspective on the feelings of others.
16,27,42,45-49 Does
this imply that empathic individuals are likely to be over-
whelmed by the feelings of others? It does not seem to
be the rule. As the results of one study suggest, the
inhibitory gating mechanism might also be more active
in more empathic individuals.
40 Furthermore, indepen-
dent cognitive factors are known to modulate our
empathic responses. For instance, in male individuals who
observe another person experiencing pain, simulation
can be abolished if the person receiving pain had been
unfair towards them in a game taking place before the
experiment.
50
Shared circuits in autism
Given the apparent relevance of shared circuits for com-
prehending other’s feelings from a first-person perspec-
tive, researchers started investigating the integrity of
these circuits in autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The
results, however, are not straightforward. Data concern-
ing hand action observation show that, in some contexts
at least, individuals with ASD activate their premotor
cortex just as control individuals do.
51-53 On the other
hand, they do not experience difficulties with the imita-
tion of goal-directed actions either,
54,55 in contrast with
what is commonly assumed in the literature on “mirror
neurons and autism.” 
The study of the cerebral network involved in the per-
ception of facial expressions may have provided a some-
what clearer picture. Table I summarizes the results of six
studies that compared individuals with ASD and controls
during the processing of facial expressions, and that report
whole-brain analyses. In the first experiment, children of
12±2 years of age observed and imitated facial expres-
sions.
56Area BA44 in the ventral premotor cortex was less
active in participants with ASD, and the activation at this
level was negatively correlated with symptom severity.
Two subsequent investigations with children and adoles-
cents produced similar findings in tasks where the partic-
Study Groups Stimuli Task Group differences
Dapretto et al
56 10 ASD and  Emotional facial Observe ASD failed to activate BA44. The group difference was
10 TD (12±2 y) expressions and imitate significant (57, 10, 16*). Activity in BA44 was negatively 
correlated with autistic symptoms.
Bookheimer et al
57 12 ASD and  Neutral upright Match same face TD activated the PrC /inf frontal sulcus for matching both
12 TD (8-19 y) and inverted faces upright and inverted faces. No such activation was found in 
ASD. The activity for controls (34, 10, 32* on the right) is 
some 28 mm apart from Dapretto et al's. 
Uddin et al
58 12 ASD and  Morphed faces Press key No between-group difference for Self-face morphs. For
12 TD (8-17 y) between self and  (Self or Other) Other-face morphs, there was slightly more activity in
other (neutral) BA44/45 for TD (0.01 uncorrected t=1.7). The peak of main 
difference (44, 32, 8*) is some 27 mm apart from 
Dapretto et al's.
Ashwin et al
59 13 ASD and 13 TD  Fearful faces  Press key when a Amygdala and OFC were less active in ASD and their activity
(31±9 and 25±5 y)  (2 levels), neutral  picture appears was not modulated by fear intensity. No vPMC activity
–not age matched and scrambled faces whatsoever.
Pierce et al
60 8 ASD and 10 TD  Neutral faces, Detect female ASD showed no activity in MPFC for familiar faces while
(16-42 y)  familiar or not faces controls did. The left PrC gyrus was active for familiar faces
–not IQ matched in both groups (the difference familiar vs unfamiliar was 
not significant).
Hadjikhani et al
61 9 ASD and 7 TD  Neutral faces Passive viewing Multiple regions of interest analysis. ASD failed to activate
(34±11 y)  PrC and PoC, and activated the STS and the IFG very weakly
–not gender-matched (the group difference was significant).
Table I. Six FMRI studies investigating face processing in participants with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing (TD) individuals,
and providing whole brain results. ASD, participants with autism spectrum disorder; TD, typically developing individuals; BA44/45, inferior
frontal gyrus pars opercularis/triangularis; PrC, Precentral gyrus/sulcus; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbito-frontal cortex; vPMC, ven-
tral premotor cortex; PoC, post-central gyrus/sulcus; STS, superior temporal sulcus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; *, Talairach coordinates
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ipants had to match upright and inverted faces,
57 or had to
recognize themselves in a set of morphed pictures.
58
The results with adults appear quite different. Two out of
three studies did not find any group difference in premo-
tor areas.
59,60A single study with autistic adults documented
a hypoactivation in this region.
61This study included only
9 ASD and 7 typically developing (TD) participants, and
there were twice as many females in the TD group. Since
females tend to be more empathic,
62 and therefore simu-
late more than males,
29 the difference between groups may
well be the consequence of the difference in sex ratio. In
summary, the available data suggests that the simulation
of facial expression in the premotor cortex is reduced in
young children with autism, but this no longer seems to be
the case in adults. This conclusion is supported by a recent
study showing that facial mimicry tends to improve with
age in autism, with older children showing more occur-
rences of congruent muscular response to happy faces.
63
Concluding remarks
Brain imaging research shows that part of the network
supporting action execution is activated during action
observation. This appears to be the same for other net-
works supporting the basic sensations of touch and pain,
or the emotions of disgust and pleasure. To some extent,
the cortex experiences the feelings of others as if it was
its own, and this information, along with other more cog-
nitive processes, may help the observer understand the
state of mind of others. The simulation in one’s own brain
of the actions and feelings of others is apparently
increased in more empathic individuals. Whether indi-
viduals with autism hypoactivate the shared networks for
actions and sensations is still hotly debated. Our review
suggests, however, that motor simulation of facial expres-
sions may be dysfunctional in young individuals with
ASD.  ❏
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Empatía: circuitos comunes y sus 
disfunciones
El observar la acción de otro individuo sobre un
objeto gatilla actividad cerebral bastante más allá
de la corteza visual del observador en áreas direc-
tamente involucradas en acciones de planeamiento
y ejecución. Esto se denominará acción de simula-
ción. Es importante considerar que el cerebro no
sólo simula las acciones de otros, sino también las
sensaciones que ellos sienten y sus respuestas emo-
cionales. Estos mecanismos de simulación son más
activos en individuos que refieren ser muy empáti-
cos. Ciertamente la simulación puede constituir un
instrumento para nuestra comprensión del estado
mental y emocional de las personas ante nosotros,
y puede contribuir potentemente a las interaccio-
nes sociales con nuestros pares al entregar una pers-
pectiva en primera persona de sus sentimientos
internos. Los mecanismos de simulación comienzan
a operar en etapas precoces del desarrollo social y
pueden ser defectuosos en sujetos jóvenes con tras-
tornos del espectro autista (TEA). Sin embargo, los
resultados a la fecha en relación con los TEA no son
definitivos y existe igual número de estudios que
entregan hallazgos tanto positivos como negativos.  
Empathie : circuits partagés et leurs troubles
Observer quelqu’un d’autre jouer avec un objet
déclenche une activité cérébrale bien au-delà du
cortex visuel de l’observateur, dans des aires direc-
tement impliquées dans des actions de planification
et d’exécution. C’est ce que nous appellerons une
simulation de l’action. Il faut noter que le cerveau
ne simule pas seulement les agissements des autres
mais aussi leurs sensations et leurs réponses émo-
tionnelles. Ces mécanismes de simulation sont plus
actifs chez les personnes qui disent être très empa-
thiques. La simulation peut en effet jouer un rôle
clé dans notre compréhension de l’état mental et
émotionnel de personnes de notre entourage et
peut fortement contribuer aux interactions sociales
avec nos pairs en leur fournissant une perspective
personnelle sur leurs sentiments intimes. Des méca-
nismes de simulation sont actifs à un stade précoce
du développement social et peuvent être absents
chez les jeunes autistes. Cependant, les résultats
concernant les autistes ne sont pas nets à ce jour et
il existe autant d’études positives que négatives.
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